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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact of credit rating announcements on 
bond spreads, CDS spreads and CDS basis in Europe. The impact of rating 
announcements is analyzed for 20 European countries. The data sample begins 
30.12.1994 and ends 11.2.2015. This thesis studies the subject from three aspects. 
Firstly, do the credit rating announcements have an impact on bond and CDS markets? 
Secondly, can bond and CDS markets anticipate the future credit rating changes? 
Thirdly, has the impact of credit rating announcements changed before and after the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy? Additionally the CDS basis is used to study the 
mispricing between bond and CDS markets. 
 
A fixed effects panel data regression is used for the analysis.  The results for the first 
analysis show that the bond and CDS markets are not totally efficient. As the previous 
studies have proven, in general, the negative credit rating announcements have an 
impact on bond and CDS markets. 
 
The bond market is able to anticipate rating changes from S&P and Fitch and negative 
revisions from Moody’s. The CDS market is able to anticipate most of the negative 
announcements. The CDS basis shows some mispricing between these two markets in a 
30 day window before the announcements. 
 
These results indicate that the rating agencies still have a significant role for investors in 
Europe. The market is able to anticipate the future rating changes, but there is still a 
large correction in prices around the rating announcement. CDS basis analysis shows 
that the pricing between bond and CDS markets is effective around the rating 
announcements. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: credit rating, sovereign bond, CDS, CDS-basis, sovereign debt crisis   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the financial crisis the European Commission has criticized credit rating 
agencies on worsening the financial crisis. In July 2011 the President of European 
Commission Jose Manuel Barroso criticized Moody’s investor service being biased and 
speculative after lowering the credit rating of Portugal to junk status. In June 2013 the 
new regulation for credit rating industry was put into force. 
 
This master’s thesis investigates if the credit ratings still have a role in current economy. 
The impact of credit rating announcements on sovereign bonds, credit default swaps and 
CDS basis is investigated. The study follows mainly the methodology by Afonso, 
Furceri and Gomez (2012). The contribution comes from more recent data and taking 
into account the mispricing between bond and CDS markets in the form of CDS basis. 
By my knowledge, there have not been any researches that take the CDS basis into 
consideration. The CDS basis is a key figure that takes into account the difference 
between the CDS spread and asset swap spread. 
 
There have been a lot of studies about the impact of credit rating changes on bond 
market, for example Steiner & Heinke (2001), Grande and Parsley (2005) and Afonso, 
Furceri and Gomez (2012). All of them find out that rating downgrades have a 
significant effect, but rating upgrades rarely matter. Afonso, Furceri and Gomez (2012) 
study the impact of credit rating changes on yield spreads and CDS spreads in Europe. 
They achieve significant results on rating downgrades and the results are more 
significant for yields than for CDS spreads. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the credit rating announcements from 
the three largest rating agencies - Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and 
Fitch Ratings - have an impact on bond-market, CDS market and their common key 
figure CDS basis. The impact of credit rating announcements on bond and CDS markets 
is widely studied, but according to my knowledge the impact of credit rating 
announcements on CDS basis has not been studied in any scientific journal.  
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The CDS basis is a key figure that connects the bond and CDS markets together and 
informs about mispricing in these markets. By the efficient market hypothesis a CDS 
spread and a bond spread should be equally priced to eliminate the arbitrage 
possibilities. In practice the markets are not totally efficient and mispricing exists 
occasionally. An imbalance indicates about a turmoil on the market. This misprizing is 
quickly corrected by the arbitrageurs. 
 
 
1.2 Results shortly 
 
The results about the impact of credit rating announcements on Bond and CDS markets 
in Europe are in line with the previous studies. Regardless of a five year longer time 
period than used by Afonso et al. 2012, the results are within a very small marginal 
from their results for bond and CDS markets around the rating announcements. 
Principally only the negative announcements are significant. The CDS basis shows no 
mispricing in a two-day period. 
 
The anticipation analysis shows that bond market is able to predict rating changes from 
S&P and Fitch and negative revisions from Moody’s. The CDS market is able to 
anticipate most of the negative announcements. Differing from the two-day analysis the 
CDS basis shows mispricing between bond and CDS markets in the anticipation 
analysis. 
 
Interestingly, the impact of credit rating announcements has increased for CDS spreads 
in the post-Lehman bankruptcy period, when comparing to the pre-Lehman period. The 
market efficiency has increased for bond yields and the pricing process has improved 
according to CDS basis. On average the rating actions from S&P and Moody’s are more 
significant than those from Fitch, but the results differ between analyzes. The bond and 
CDS markets are not fully efficient because some of the rating actions have an impact 
on these markets. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The study is structured as follows: First, the previous studies are presented in chapter 2. 
The third chapter handles the theoretical background about the main concepts that are 
essential for the thesis, for example efficient market hypothesis, bond and CDS markets, 
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credit ratings and financial crisis. The chapter 4 describes the data that is used to 
perform the analysis. The fifth chapter handles the regression methods used for the 
analysis. The chapter 6 goes through the empirical results and the final chapter 
concludes the findings of this study.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
This chapter focuses on previous studies about the impact of credit rating 
announcements on various markets. The earlier studies are presented in a timely order 
and can be reviewed from the table 1. The chapter 2.1 describes the studies that 
investigate the impact of credit rating announcements on bond, CDS and capital 
markets. The chapter 2.2 handles the criticism against credit rating agencies during the 
financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis. The chapter 2.3 concentrates on the 
transmission of financial crises between markets and locations. The spillover effect is 
described in chapter 2.4. The hypotheses of this study are presented in chapter 2.5. 
 
 
2.1 The impact of credit rating announcements on various markets 
 
John Hull, Mirela Predescu and Alan White (2004) study the relationship between credit 
default swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements. The study 
concentrates on corporate bonds and CDSs. They find that the CDS market is able to 
predict all negative rating events in advance. There is a significant increase in CDS 
spreads before rating downgrades. Reviews for downgrade and negative outlooks are 
anticipated 30 days before the event. Only review for downgrade contains new 
information on announcement day. They find no significance on positive events.  
 
Hull et al. (2004) also study the predicting power of CDS changes on rating events. 
They find that 40-50 % of rating events come from top quartile of CDS changes. Most 
of the future rating changes happen to previously rated companies. This phenomenon is 
called ratings momentum. 
 
Norden & Weber (2003) study the impact of credit rating announcements on CDS 
market and stock market during the years 2000-2002. The data consists of company 
CDS and stock market data from three continents (Asia, United States and Europe). 
Their results show for example that both CDS and stock markets are able to anticipate 
the rating downgrades 60-90 days before the announcement day. When analyzing all 
rating action simultaneously, only the reviews for downgrade from S&P and Moody’s 
are significant. 
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Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) study the reaction of emerging market credit default 
swaps to sovereign credit rating changes. The study has four aspects. First they study 
whether the credit rating announcements contain new information to CDS market. If the 
CDS market is efficient, a credit rating announcement has no impact on the market. 
Secondly, they examine if the CDS spreads can be used for predicting future rating 
changes. Previous study by Hull et al. (2004) showed that the changes in credit default 
swap spreads can be used for predicting rating changes in the case of well rated 
companies. Thirdly, they study the spillover effect and whether the prior 
announcements have an impact on spillover effect. And lastly they investigate if the 
economic fundaments can explain the magnitude of future spillovers. 
 
The results show that emerging markets react differently to credit rating 
announcements. Credit rating announcements do not bring new information to the 
market. Only credit rating upgrades have a slight impact on the CDS spreads. This is 
against the results from other studies (Hull et al. 2004 and Afonso et al. 2012). The 
CDS market anticipates the future rating announcements in advance. There is also some 
spillover to non-event markets in the case of positive announcements. As the other 
studies have shown (Hull et al. 2004, Afonso et al. 2012), the CDS market is useful for 
predicting the future rating changes. 
 
Afonso et al. (2012) study the effect of credit rating announcements on yield spreads 
and CDS spreads in Europe from 1995 to 2010. The data consists of 24 EU countries 
and corresponding credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The study 
has four aspects. First they study, how the yield and CDS markets react to credit rating 
announcements and whether the effect is anticipated by the markets. They distinguish 
the difference between EMU and non-EMU countries. Authors also study if the impact 
of credit rating announcements has changed after the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Secondly, they study whether the sovereign ratings lead or cause changes in yield and 
CDS spreads over other yield determinants. Thirdly they study the spillover effect of 
credit rating announcements from event country to other EU countries. Lastly they 
study whether the downgrades or upgrades have different impacts on the market. 
(Afonso et al. 2012). 
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The findings of Afonso et al. (2012) can be stated as follows: 
 
- The market reacts significantly on rating changes and outlook notations.  
- The reaction is especially strong in the case of negative announcements, while 
positive rating changes hardly influence the market. 
- In the case of EMU countries the positive rating events decrease the yields 
slightly.  
- The CDS market reacts more strongly on negative rating effects after the 2008 
Lehman brother bankruptcy.  
- The spillover effect is especially strong from lower rated countries to higher 
rated countries.  
- Sovereign ratings and yields cause each other in a 1-2 week window. Rating 
changes are not anticipated in the previous 1-2 months by market. 
- The countries that have been downgraded within the last 6 months face higher 
spreads. 
 
 
Rasha Alsakka and Owain ap Gwilym (2012) study the impact of credit rating 
announcements on foreign exchange market from 1994 to 2010. They find that the 
foreign exchange market reacts to the rating announcements and the negative 
announcements are more significant than positive. The reactions differ between 
developed and developing countries and agencies. The rating announcements from Fitch 
ratings are most significant on majority of tests. 
 
Year 2013, Rasha Alsakka and Owain ap Gwilym (2013) study the market impact and 
spillovers of credit rating actions on foreign exchange market during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. They investigate if the actions of the credit rating agencies 
actually worsened the crisis, but they cannot find any evidence that credit rating 
agencies would have worsened the crisis on purpose. The market reacts more strongly 
on the credit rating changes during the crisis but this happens because new information 
is brought to the market. 
 
The impact of credit rating announcements in a short time scale is studied by Simona 
Boffelli and Giovanni Urga (2015). They use a specific jump and co-jump model for 
analyzing the impact of macro announcements and credit rating announcements on 10 
year government bond spreads for Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain. 
A 5 minute data from 1/2009 to 5/2012 is used in the study. Both, the impact in event 
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country and spillover effect are observed. The event window for macro announcements 
is -1 hour to +1 hour and for unscheduled credit actions -2 hours to +2 hours. (Boffelli 
et al 2015). 
 
Boffelli and Urga (2015) find that the macro announcement that concern the real 
economies of the U.S. and Euro area have the largest impact on bond spreads. For 
example the employment indicators, production indicators and single country 
confidence indicators and purchase manager indexes have the most significant influence 
on the market. For single country events the macro announcements in Germany and 
Spain have the largest impact on the market. The credit rating announcements hardly 
impact bond spreads in this short time window. However, the announcements from S&P 
and Moody’s have the largest impact.  
 
The rating actions that consider the largest countries, for example Belgium, Italy and 
Spain have some impact. The fact that rating actions hardly impact the bond spreads is 
against the previous studies that use longer time scales (Alsakka and Gwilym 2012, 
Alsakka and Gwilym 2013). The study by Boffelli et al. (2015) does not take into 
account the anticipation actions from rating agencies. Other studies have proven that the 
outlook and review announcements have even larger impact on the market than the 
actual announcements. (Boffelli et al 2015). 
 
Huong Vu, Rasha Alsakka & Owain ap Gwilym (2015) study the impact of credit rating 
announcements on bond spreads with split ratings. They find that only the splits 
between S&P and Moody’s have an impact on the market. The credit events from Fitch 
have no significant market implication. Expectably the downgrades on inferior ratings 
and upgrades on superior ratings are more significant than vice versa. Standard & 
Poor’s is the most conservative credit rating agency among the three agencies. 
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Table 1. Previous studies in a timely order. 
 
Year Author Topic Findings 
2004 Hull, Predescu 
& White 
The relationship between credit default 
swap spreads, bond yields and credit 
rating announcements 
The CDS market is able to predict all negative rating events in advance. There is a significant 
increase in CDS spreads before rating downgrades. Positive events have no impact on the 
market. Most of the future rating changes happen to previously rated companies. 
2010 Ismailescu & 
Kazemi 
The reaction of emerging market credit 
default swaps to sovereign credit rating 
changes 
Only credit rating upgrades have a slight impact on the CDS spreads. The CDS market 
anticipates the future rating announcements in advance.  The CDS market is useful for 
predicting future rating changes. 
2012 Afonso, 
Furceri & 
Gomes 
Sovereign credit ratings and financial 
market linkages: Application to 
European data 
Significant effects especially after negative announcements. The CDS market reacts more 
strongly to negative rating effects after the 2008 Lehman brother bankruptcy. Spillover effect 
from lower rated countries to higher rated countries. 
2013 Alsakka & ap 
Gwilym 
Rating  agencies’  signals  during  the  
European  sovereign  debt  crisis: 
Rating actions affect the own-country exchange rates and have a significant spillover effect on 
other exchange rates. The impact is stronger during the financial crisis. 
2015 Bofelli & 
Urga 
Macroannouncements, bond auctions 
and rating actions in the European 
government bond spreads 
Credit rating announcements hardly influence bond spreads in 2 to 4 hour windows. Rating 
actions from S&P and Moody's have the largest impact. 
2015 Vu, Alsakka 
& ap Gwilym 
The credit signals that matter most for 
sovereign bond spreads with split 
ratings. 
Only split ratings between S&P and Moody's are significant. Downgrades of inferior ratings and 
upgrades on superior ratings are more significant than vice versa. 
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2.3 The criticism against credit rating agencies 
 
The small amount of credit rating agencies has been criticized in U.S. and in Europe. 
Michael K. Ong (2002: 87-89) provides two possible reasons for the problem. Firstly, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required that the credit rating 
agencies need to be nationally recognized organizations. After 1975 the regulation has 
limited the entry of new credit rating agencies. Secondly, he states that the bondholders 
tend to use only few sources to look for the ratings. 
 
The earning model of the credit rating agencies has also been criticized. The credit 
rating agencies receive their income from the rated companies. This may cause a moral 
hazard behavior to provide a good rating in return for a higher compensation. In the 
U.S. all SEC- registered corporate bonds are rated, but if the company requests for a 
rating, a one-time fee is charged, but it has an ability to provide information for the 
formation of rating. This cannot be fully applied for rating of sovereign entities. (Ong 
2002: 89-91). 
 
The new rules from The European Commission (2013) to the credit rating industry 
came in to effect in summer 2013. It is important to study how the market reacts to the 
new regulation. The new regulation has five main objectives: 
 
 
1. Reduce overreliance on credit ratings 
2. Improve quality of ratings of sovereign debt of EU Member States 
3. Make credit rating agencies more accountable for their actions 
4. Reduce conflicts of interest due to the issuer pays remuneration model and 
encourage the entrance of more players on to the credit rating market 
5. Publication of ratings on European Rating Platform. 
 
 
The credit rating agencies did contribute to financial crisis by rating the subprime 
mortgage securities too laxly, but there is no proof that the credit rating agencies had 
contributed to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. One purpose of this study is to 
analyze if the impact of credit rating announcements on bond and CDS markets has 
changed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. If the impact of credit rating 
announcements has reduced, the overreliance on credit rating announcements has 
reduced. 
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2.4 The transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises 
 
Theoharry Grammatikos and Robert Vermeulen (2012) study the transmission of the 
financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices, CDS spreads and 
exchange rates. They divide the market into three groups: North, South and Small to 
examine the spreading of crises in different parts of Europe.  A daily dataset from 2003 
to 2010 is used in the study. Financial and non-financial stock indices are analyzed 
separately. 
 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen find out that during the financial crisis, the smallest EMU 
countries are relatively isolated from the U.S. events. This is explained by illiquidity of 
these markets. The Northern EMU countries are the most linked to the events in the 
United States. The U.S. financials have a statistically significant impact to North and 
South EMU countries, but the US non-financials have even greater impact to the EMU 
non-financials. During the financial crisis the crisis transmission from U.S. non-
financials on EMU non-financials is prominent. 
 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) study the transmission of the sovereign debt crisis 
in the second part of their study. The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy is used as a dividing 
point between the two data samples and the financials and non-financials are also 
analyzed separately. Before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers the CDS spread 
between Greece and Germany had an impact on the financials of only the smallest EMU 
countries.  
 
The correlation between the Greece and German CDS spreads was 0.87 before the 
Lehman bankruptcy and 0.31 after the bankruptcy. The Greek based problems separate 
the correlation after the bankruptcy. All three groups: North, South and Small are 
impacted by the Greek CDS spread in the post-Lehman period. The southern countries 
face the increased default risk of their own in the crisis, while the Northern group faces 
the problems of possessing large amounts of Greek debt (75 percent of the Greek 
government debt was in the foreign possession). The Southern group is the most 
affected by the Greek CDS spread. The financials and non-financials are similarly 
affected by the Greek CDS spread, but the impact on financials is much stronger. 
 
The third part of the study by Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012: 530-531) studies the 
effects of euro-dollar exchange rates during the crisis. The correlation between the euro-
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dollar exchange rates and stock prices changes during the crisis. Before the crisis an 
increase in euro leads into lower return in financial indexes, while during the crisis an 
increase in U.S. dollar results an increase in financial indexes. This is explained by 
“harmful to exports” effect before the crisis and “signal of economic strength” effect 
during the crisis. 
 
Yalin Gündüz & Orcun Kaya (2014) studied the impacts of financial crisis on Eurozone 
sovereign CDS spreads. They test the long-lasting memory of CDS market using an 
ARFIMA-FIGARCH model. Granger causality tests are utilized to analyze the causality 
between CDS volatility and CDS spread. Their findings can be stated as follows: 
Firstly, they find that the price discovery process fulfills the minimum requirements of 
market efficiency. This means that the prices reflect all historical information. 
Secondly, long-memory of volatility is only found from the crisis countries. Long-
memory of volatility can be described as the ability to recover from crisis. Thirdly, they 
find that the sovereign uncertainty spreads from credit default market into stock market. 
Fourthly, they prove that the shocks tend to spillover from core countries into periphery. 
 
 
2.5 The spillover effect of credit rating announcements 
 
Amar Grande & David C. Parsley (2005) study the news spillovers in the sovereign 
debt market from 1991 to 2000. Their dataset consists of all U.S. dollar denominated 
sovereigns traded on daily basis. The findings show that the spillover effect is 
asymmetric. Negative events increase other countries sovereign spreads, but positive 
events have no impact. A one-notch downgrade leads into 12 basis points increase in 
sovereign spreads of other countries. The spillover effect cumulates; recent similar 
rating downgrades increase the sovereign spread more than individual rating 
downgrades. 
 
Benjamin M. Blay and Brian S. Roseman (2014) study the impact of credit rating 
downgrade of the U.S. on European CDS spreads. The credit rating of the U.S. was 
downgraded for the first time in the country’s history, on 5 August 2011. Surprisingly - 
against the theory of CDS spreads - the downgrade decreased the U.S. treasury rates and 
the CDS spreads remained unchanged. The decrease in treasury rates is explained by 
fight to safety effect. The decrease of the U.S. credit rating caused the investors to 
liquidate the riskier investments and transfer the money into safer treasury bonds. 
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Whereas in Europe, the decrease of the U.S. credit rating led into increase in the CDS 
spreads. Especially the countries with lowest GDP and the countries that had not been 
downgraded lately had a significant increase in CDS spreads. Also the countries in 
EMU had a significant increase in CDS spreads. (Blay et al. 2014: 131.) 
 
Blay & Roseman (2014) used three time windows in their research, pre-downgrade-, 
downgrade- and post-downgrade periods. The results indicate that the European CDS 
spreads anticipated the incoming U.S downgrade and increased already in the pre-
downgrade period. The decrease is both statically and economically significant. During 
the downgrade period the CDS spreads and corresponding volatility experienced high 
levels. The levels remained high also in post-downgrade period. 
 
Blay & Roseman state that their results are in line with the previous studies for example 
with Norden and Weber 2004. The CDS market is able to anticipate the upcoming 
negative market events. In contrast to the study by Afonso et al. (2012) the downgrade 
of a well rated country has a significant impact on the market. The authors remark that 
the results of this study must be dealt with caution. There is only one event in the study, 
because the U.S. credit rating has been downgraded only once during its history. Other 
simultaneous events could have distorted the results. Unreported tests prove that 
multicollinearity does not exist. 
 
Rasha Alsakka, Owain ap Gwilym & Tuyet Nhung Vu (2014) study the impact of 
sovereign rating downgrades to banking sector during the European debt crisis. They 
find that the credit rating downgrades are not linked into bank ratings before the crisis, 
but the linkage exists during the crisis. Both sovereign rating downgrades and negative 
watch signals have strong linkage to bank rating downgrades. Multiple-notch 
downgrades from S&P have the strongest impact on bank ratings. On average a bank 
has two notches lower rating than the corresponding sovereign. 
 
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
 
Three different hypotheses are studied in this thesis. The first hypothesis investigates if 
the sovereign debt market (CDS market) is efficient. Referring to Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) there should be no new information in the credit rating 
announcements. CRAs use publicly available information to create the credit ratings. 
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H1: Sovereign debt market (CDS market) is efficient and not effected by rating 
announcements. 
 
 
The second hypothesis analyzes the predicting power of bond market, CDS market and 
CDS basis. The previous studies have shown that the CDS market anticipates the future 
rating changes for developing markets one month before the announcement. This 
hypothesis analyzes if this is true for European market. 
 
 
H2: The bond (CDS) market anticipates the future credit rating change. 
 
 
The third hypothesis examines if the credit rating announcements have different impacts 
on bond and CDS markets before and after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. If the impact 
of these announcements has reduced or disappeared, the markets have become more 
efficient. In theory the market should be more efficient nowadays. 
 
 
H3: The bond (CDS) market reaction to sovereign credit ratings has not changed in 
time.  
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of credit rating announcements on bond 
(CDS) market in Europe. In this chapter I go through all the main concepts that are 
essential for understanding the subject. Concepts like efficient market hypothesis, 
sovereign bonds, credit default swaps, credit default swap basis and credit ratings are 
handled. 
 
 
3.1 Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
 
In 1970 Eugene F. Fama presented his article “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work”, which is the fundament for the efficient market 
hypothesis. Efficient market hypothesis states that all available information is instantly 
taken into account in the prices. This would mean that credit rating announcements 
would not have any impact on the market. Credit rating agencies use publicly available 
data to construct the ratings and this data should already be taken into account in the 
prices. There are three forms of tests for efficient markets: weak-form, semi strong-form 
and strong-form. 
 
Weak form of efficiency means that current prices reflect all the information from the 
historical prices. Semi-strong-form of efficiency means that prices include all obviously 
publicly available information. Strong-form of efficiency means that prices include even 
the information that is only available to investors or groups that have monopolistic 
access to the data. The study (Fama 1970: 414-415) states that the tests strongly support 
weak-form of efficiency. Semi-strong form of efficiency is also supported in majority of 
the tests. Only strong-form of efficiency can be discarded, because of proof about 
profitable insider trading. 
 
In practice, the market reacts to the credit rating announcements (Hull et al. 2004, 
Ismailescu et al. 2010 and Afonso et al. 2012). Many sorts of anomalies like January 
effect, Days of the Week, Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) et cetera, exists in the 
market. Fama (1970: 146) mentioned that the subject needs more studying and there are 
shortages in the study.  In the academic world the efficient market hypothesis was 
overly trusted from the 70’s. Only during the past years the academic world has 
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admitted the inefficiency of the markets. In practice the market anomalies are rather a 
norm than an exception. The term anomaly can be stated misleading. 
 
 
3.2 Sovereign bonds 
 
A sovereign bond is a debt security issued by a sovereign government. The government 
issues a bond, which obligates it to pay specified payments to the purchaser of the bond 
on specific dates. The bond may consist of annual/semiannual payment or solely of the 
face value of the bond. The bond price is calculated using formula 1. The summation 
presents the annual/semiannual coupon payments and the latter part of the formula 
presents the face value paid at maturity. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011: 474-478).  
 
 
(1)                    𝑃𝐵 = ∑
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
+
𝑃𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
Where, 
PB = price of the bond 
C = coupon payments 
T = Periods to maturity 
r = discount rate 
 
 
A government bond can be a zero-coupon bond, which means that there are no interest 
payments during the loan period. The investor receives the face value at maturity. The 
formula 2 presents the valuation of a zero coupon bond. (Bodie et al. 2011: 474-478). 
 
 
(2)                    𝑃𝑧𝑐𝑏 =
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
 
 
 
The governments issue debt to compensate their budget deficits. There are other ways 
for financing budget deficit, like selling government assets and raising the amount of 
money in the market. In the Eurozone the governments have renounced their right to 
regulate the amount of money, which means that the debt financing is even more 
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important for these countries. Selling government assets is rarely a good source for 
financing in the long run. 
 
The cost of capital for a sovereign issuer is calculated as a bond spread. Bond spread is 
a difference between a yield of an AAA-rated issuer and a yield of lower rated issuer. In 
Europe the bond spread is generally calculated with respect to German Bund. The 
German bunds are often considered as a “safe haven” among the sovereign issuers. 
Formerly the spread was calculated in Europe with respect to the bond of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Credit risk of international sovereign bonds is measured by credit rating agencies, for 
example Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch Ratings. Sovereign 
bonds are often considered as risk free investments, but this is not the case, at least for 
emerging markets. Credit ratings are often divided into two groups: investment-grade 
bonds and speculative-grade/junk bonds. Investment grade bonds are rated BBB/Baa 
(S&P and Fitch/Moody’s) or above. (Bodie et al. 2011: 496-498.) 
 
 
3.3 Credit Default Swaps 
 
Credit default swap is an instrument that is used as an insurance policy against the 
default of a company or a sovereign entity. The CDS buyer pays an annual premium 
and the seller is bound to compensate for the loss of the buyer in the event of a default. 
There are two ways for the compensation in the case of default, physical settlement and 
cash settlement. A physical settlement means that the issuer accepts the defaulted bond 
and pays the par value to the insurance taker. A cash settlement means that the 
insurance taker holds onto bond and the CDS issuer pays the difference between the par 
value of a bond and its market value. (Bodie et al. 2011: 496-498.) 
 
The price of a credit default swap price consists of two legs: one leg consists of the 
premium payments and the other leg consists of the contingent default payment. The 
present value is calculated as a sum of present values of these payments. The theoretical 
valuation formula can be seen in formula 3. (Choudhry 2010: 251-254.) 
 
 
(3)                     𝑠 =  
∫ [1 − 𝑅 − 𝐴𝑡𝑅]𝑞𝑡𝑣𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
∫ 𝑞𝑡[𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡]𝑑𝑡 +  𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝑇
0
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Where, dividend presents the expected payoffs from the CDS contract 
Divider presents the value of payments made by the buyer. 
s = CDS spread 
T = life of CDS in years 
qt = risk neutral probability density at time t 
R = expected recovery rate on the reference obligation in a risk neutral world 
At = accrued interest on the reference obligation at time t as a percent of face value 
ut = present value of payments at rate of 1$ per year on payment dates between t=0 and 
time t 
et = present value of an accrual payment at time t equal to t-t*, where t* is the payment 
date immediately after t. 
vt = present value of 1$ received at time t 
π = the risk neutral probability of no credit event during the life of the swap 
(Choudhry 2010: 251-254.) 
 
Market practitioners use a discrete form pricing approach instead of the theoretical 
model, this is presented in formula 4. 
 
 
(4)                     𝑠𝑁 = (1 − R) ∑
𝐷𝐹𝑖(𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑖−1𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑖
∑ 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑖𝐴𝑖 + (𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑖−1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑖)
𝐴𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Where, the dividend presents the present value of contingent leg and the divider 
presents the present value of fee leg (no default + default accrual). 
sN = par spread for maturity N 
DFi = discount factor from time t=0 to t=i 
PNDi = probability of no degault from t=0 to t=i 
Ai = accrual period from Ti-1 to Ti 
(Choudhry 2010: 254-257.) 
 
Credit default swaps are used by large bondholders and banks to control the credit risk. 
A bondholder can buy lower rated bonds and secure the position by using credit default 
swaps. A lower rated bond together with a CDS contract can be considered as an AAA 
rated investment. The possibility of default of the CDS issuer must be taken into 
account. The price of a credit default swap is calculated as a premium between AAA 
rated bond and the bond that is secured. (Bodie et al. 2011: 496-498.) 
 
Credit default swaps were made to secure bond investments but are commonly used for 
speculating the health of a company or sovereign. In the case of Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, a total worth of $400 billion CDS contracts were outstanding in the market, 
while the worth of Lehman Brothers bonds was only $150 billion. This kind of 
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situations can have massive impacts to the financial world. The problem during the 
credit meltdown of 2008 was the lack of transparency in the CDS market. CDS 
contracts are two sided contracts that are traded over the counter. This means that 
monitoring the market is difficult. The overall risk was hidden from the market 
participants. (Bodie et al. 2011: 496-498.) 
 
John Hull, Mirela Perdescu and Alan White (2004) study the relationship between credit 
default swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements. They study which 
benchmark risk-free rate is used by market participants on CDS market. They find that 
the market participants use the zero swap rates as a risk free rate rather than the treasury 
rate used in literature.  
 
 
3.4 The Credit default swap basis 
 
The credit default swap basis (CDS basis) is a key figure that measures market 
sentiment between synthetic and money markets. The figure describes the mispricing of 
these instruments. The CDS basis can be explained as a difference between the price of 
a CDS and asset swap spread in money market. Theoretically the CDS price should be 
equal to asset swap spread, but they commonly differ in practice. CDS contracts are 
solely made for trading credit risk, while bond prices are affected by multiple factors. 
Variation in supply and demand has also an impact on the basis. (Choudhry 2010: 358-
359.) 
 
The CDS basis can be used as a market indicator. The varying demand of cash in 
contrast to synthetic risk describes the market sentiment. Generally the CDS market 
leads the money market, but in some cases it goes the other way round. The leading role 
of the CDS market is explained by better liquidity. CDS contracts can be traded in large 
quantities without impacting the market. (Choudhry 2010: 359-361.) 
 
 
(5)   CDS basis = Credit default spread (D) – Asset swap spread (S) 
 
 
The CDS basis can be calculated as presented in formula 5, where asset swap spread is 
the spread between the asset and risk free rate. For example the yield of Greece minus 
the yield of Germany, where the yield of Germany is considered as a risk free rate. The 
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CDS basis is typically positive, but if the asset swap spread is larger than the CDS 
spread, the market provides arbitrage possibilities. The greater demand of CDS 
contracts drives the basis to negative, but other factors drive it to positive. (Choudhry 
2010: 359-361.) 
 
The driving factors behind the basis can be divided into two subgroups: technical 
factors and market factors. Technical factors include the following aspects: CDS 
premiums, counterparty risk, greater protection level, accrued coupon and legal risks. 
The CDS premium should trade positive, because the insurance taker pays the premium 
to the CDS issuer. Greater protection level forces the CDS issuers to demand larger 
premiums, because the CDS contracts often enter into force even in technical defaults, 
when the cash bond does not lose its value. (Choudhry 2004: 13-19) 
 
The market factors include the following aspects: market demand, liquidity premium, 
shortage of cash assets, structured finance market and new market issuances. Strong 
market demand drives the CDS premiums wider if the demand does not meet with 
supply. Structured finance market has improved the liquidity of CDS market by 
providing large amounts of CDO (collateralized debt obligation) contracts. CDO 
contracts consist of multiple CDS contracts and require both issuers and insurance 
takers. Increased demand from both sides decreases premiums. New bond issuances can 
drive the basis in both ways. Investors might rush for the newly issued bond, but 
simultaneously investors might hedge the position by buying a CDS contract. 
(Choudhry 2004: 19-21) 
 
Choudhry (2004: 22) lists the factors that drive the basis wider: “CDS premiums above 
zero, the delivery option, accrued coupon, bond price below par, funding below Libor, 
legal and documentation risk, market liquidity, new bond issuance and difficulty of 
shorting cash bonds”. And the factors that drive the basis lower: “counterparty risk, 
bond priced above par, funding above Libor and impact of the structured finance 
market”. 
 
A phenomenon called “basis smile” means that both lowly and highly rated assets sell at 
higher than average basis. The higher price of highly rated protection is a result from 
the insurance buyer ending up paying over Libor rate premiums. The CDS issuer will 
demand for a higher premium. A negative basis is still more common on highly rated 
assets, but a negative basis tends to be only temporary. An arbitrage possibility forming 
from negative basis will drive the basis back to negative. (Choudhry 2004: 21-22) 
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In this thesis I study, whether the credit rating changes have an impact on CDS basis. 
First I study the impact on bond spreads and CDS spreads separately and CDS basis 
links these two spreads together. I also test if the CDS basis can be used for predicting 
future rating changes. 
 
 
3.5 Credit ratings and credit rating agencies 
 
The three largest credit rating agencies are called Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors 
Service and Fitch Ratings. Abbreviations S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are used generally in 
the thesis. The first two agencies come from the United States and Fitch Ratings is 
European, but all these act globally. Credit rating agencies produce ratings to help 
investors to invest into less known markets. A credit rating gives a picture about the 
possible default risk of the issuer, for example a sovereign entity.  
 
Michael K. Ong (2002) states that credit rating is a dynamic process. Rating changes 
along time and reflects the general fundaments of the firm and simultaneously the 
economic conditions as a whole. This can also be applied on rating of sovereign entities. 
According to Ong the credit rating is also a forward-looking process. The purpose of the 
rating process is to forecast the future outcomes. The rating updating schedule defines 
the precision of the forecast. (Ong 2002). The rating should be as accurate as possible, 
but the rating agencies aim at stability of ratings. The rating announcements should not 
be withdrawn easily. For example an institutional investor might be forced to sell their 
investment due to a rating downgrade and fast moving ratings would complicate the use 
of ratings. 
 
Credit rating agencies use publicly available data to form the ratings. This means that if 
the markets were perfectly efficient these ratings would not have any impact on the 
market. All the information would be already in the prices. In practice several studies 
have proven that credit rating announcements have an impact on the markets (Hull et al. 
2004, Ismailescu et al. 2010, Afonso et al. 2012 and etc.). The credit rating agencies are 
even criticized of having too much power on the market and causing the financial crisis 
(Alsakka et al. 2013). Many funds and institutional investors are bound to invest into 
certain rating groups. A surprising decrease in a rating may force large amount of 
institutional investors to sell their investments simultaneously and this can lead into 
steep decrease in prices.  
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3.6 Financial crisis and Sovereign debt crisis 
 
The financial crisis developed in the United States during the year 2007. The market 
participants were unaware about the low creditworthiness of the subprime-mortgage 
backed securities. In February 2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
Freddie Mac stopped buying the most risky subprime mortgage securities. In June the 
credit rating agencies Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Investor services downgraded 
over hundred bonds backed by second lien subprime mortgages. The credit rating 
agencies are accused of causing the financial crisis. (Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis 
2011).  
 
The European sovereign debt crisis accumulated in the steps of the financial crisis. The 
problem of the Euro currency is that there is no single authority that is able to control 
taxes, spending and transfers between the richer and poorer EMU countries. Some of 
the EMU countries lost the trust of financial markets, which led into sovereign debt 
crisis. (Grammatikos & Vermeulen 2012: 518).  
 
The banking sector and sovereign debt markets are closely linked together. The banking 
sector holds large part of home country sovereign debt, which exposes the banking 
sector to sovereign risks. Simultaneously the sovereign is seen as a guarantor for the 
banking sector. The next sub-chapter 3.6.1 handles one example of the possible 
corrective actions to solve the European sovereign debt crisis. Werner proposes that the 
states should return to lend from their own bank sectors rather than from international 
capital markets. (Werner 2014). 
 
3.6.1 Solving the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis Werner (2014) 
 
Werner (2014) states that: “Enhanced Debt Management is an attractive option to end 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis”. By Enhanced Debt Management he means that the 
governments should return to lending from banks in the form of ordinary bank loans. 
IMF/World bank manual emphases that direct bank lending of governments is actively 
discouraged in the past 20 years, which might be a mistake. Only bank sector has the 
ability to accumulate more GDP growth by credit creation which is lost in a bond 
issuance. Bank credit creation is the strongest determinant of nominal GDP growth. 
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Werner lists the aspects that support the EDM for government funding as follows 
(Werner 2014: 465-466):  
“ 
1. Bank loan contracts are not tradable and do not have to be marked to market. Speculative attacks 
on the debt are impossible. 
2. During the crisis, untraded bank loan funding has remained significantly cheaper than traded 
Bond finance for governments. It is surprising that debt management offices have not switched 
from bond issuance to borrowing from banks via loan contracts. Italy in 2012 could have saved 
billions of euros thanks to lower interest charges. 
3. With EDM, sovereign credit ratings are not needed (saving costs) and rating downgrades would 
be irrelevant, not affecting banks' balance sheets or the government's ability to borrow from 
banks. 
4. Bank loans are available domestically and hence deliver a more stable debt structure, 
independent from borrowing from abroad. 
5. When banks need to generate returns as reserves or capital buffers, a sustainable method is to 
allow them to earn these through growth, by lending to the government. 
6. Bank credit creation for transactions that are part of GDP has been identified as the main 
determinant of nominal GDP growth. Hence an increase in bank credit is required to boost 
nominal GDP. By borrowing from banks, governments can pump-prime bank credit creation. 
This boosts nominal GDP growth and hence domestic demand, resulting in greater employment, 
lower expenditure on unemployment benefits, greater tax revenues and hence lower deficits and 
also larger GDP, lowering the deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios by lowering the numerator and 
increasing the denominator. 
7. The bank loans are available from domestic banks without the need to request government 
assistance from the Troika, and thus avoid the intrusive conditionality, including deflationary 
structural supply-side reforms or cuts in welfare or education budgets. 
8. The banks could create the required funds out of nothing by crediting the government's accounts 
with. No capital is required for such bank lending to the sovereign according to the Basel rules. 
9. The government would save the bond issuance fee, which may be small in percentages, but can 
be substantial in absolute amounts. 
10. Finally, banks are able to utilize these non-tradable loans as sovereign collateral with the ECB to 
refinance themselves.” 
 
The possibility to prevent the dependence on credit ratings and market speculation is 
strongly in favor of bank lending for sovereign entities. If the credit creation is as strong 
as Werner states the EDM should be studied more as an alternative to bond funding. All 
sovereign governments would benefit from increased GDP growth. Simultaneously the 
banking sector would benefit from decreased risks in possessing risky government 
bonds. 
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4. DATA 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the sovereign credit rating announcements 
have an impact on bond spreads, CDS spreads and CDS bases in Europe. Three 
different datasets are used: credit rating data from the three credit rating agencies S&P, 
Fitch and Moody’s, 10 year government bond data and 5 year CDS data. The data 
sample for bond data begins 30.12.1994 and ends 11.2.2015. The sample size for credit 
rating data and CDS data varies among countries. Daily data is used because it is 
necessary for being able to observe short term changes. The impact of credit rating 
announcements is measured in [-1 to 1] and [-30 to -1] time windows. 
 
This thesis analyses the impact of credit rating announcements on 20 European 
countries. The sample length of the CDS data varies a lot among countries. The 
following European countries are chosen for the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. Afonso et al. (2012) use the data of 20 European countries from 1995 to 
2010. This thesis extends the sample length of their study for 5 years. 
 
 
4.1 The credit ratings 
 
First, the credit rating announcements and corresponding watch/outlook notations are 
used to measure the credit risk. This data is achieved from the three credit rating 
agencies S&P, Fitch and Moody’s. Both, actual rating changes and short term rating 
data from the three biggest credit rating agencies S&P, Fitch and Moody’s are used for 
the thesis. Many of the previous studies prove that the short term ratings are even more 
significant than the actual ratings. Only the outlook notations that occur outside rating 
change are used to prevent correlation with actual rating changes. In total 421 rating 
announcements from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch occur in the timeframe of the study.  
 
The number of credit rating announcements per country and CRA can be seen in table 
2. To clarify the activity of each CRA the table 3 describes these announcements per 
agency. It can be seen that the amount on upgrades and downgrades is fairly similar 
among the agencies, but the amount of outlook/watch notations differs considerably. 
The Fitch ratings have announced 92 watch/outlook notations outside actual rating 
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changes, while Standard & Poor’s has only announced 14 announcements. Standard & 
Poor’s has a tendency to release the credit watch/outlook notations simultaneously with 
credit ratings, which reduces the amount of revisions in this sample. This is why the 
results of positive revisions are not available for S&P in all the samples. Dummy 
variables are used to indicate rating changes. For example the dummies for S&P are: 
S&PUp, S&PDown, S&PPositive and S&PNegative. 
 
 
Table 2. Credit rating announcements per country (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). 
 
Upgrade Downgrade Positive Negative 
Austria - 1(1,0,0) - - 
Belgium 2(0,0,2) 4(1,1,2) - 6(0,1,5) 
Czech 8(3,2,3) 2(1,0,1) 3(0,1,2) - 
Denmark 3(1,1,1) - - - 
Finland 8(3,2,3) 1(1,0,0) - - 
France - 5(2,1,2) - 3(0,0,3) 
Germany - - - - 
Greece 18(6,4,8) 22(8,6,8) 6(0,1,5) 10(1,5,4) 
Hungary 12(4,5,3) 14(5,5,4) 6(1,3,2) 18(6,2,8) 
Ireland 11(5,4,2) 15(6,5,4) 4(2,2,0) 10(3,2,5) 
Italy 3(0,2,1) 14(6,3,5) 1(0,1,0) 8(0,1,7) 
Latvia 16(7,3,6) 12(5,3,4) 6(1,0,5) 5(0,0,5) 
Lithuania 15(4,4,7) 8(3,2,3) 9(0,2,7) 2(,0,1,1) 
Netherland - 1(1,0,0) - 3(0,0,3) 
Poland 9(4,2,3) - 6(0,0,6) - 
Portugal 6(1,4,1) 16(6,5,5) 2(0,0,2) 10(0,2,8) 
Romania 19(7,5,7) 8(3,2,3) 3(0,0,3) 4(0,0,4) 
Spain 8(3,2,3) 15(6,5,4) 1(0,1,0) 6(0,3,3) 
Sweden 7(1,3,3) 1(0,1,0) 2(0,1,1) - 
UK - 2(0,1,1) - 3(0,0,3) 
Total 145 141 49 86 
 
Note: The timeframe is from 30.12.1994 to 11.2.2015. For example for Greece upgrades 
18(6,4,8) means that Greece has received in total 18 upgrades of which 6 from S&P, 4 from 
Moody’s and 8 from Fitch. When both rating changes and revisions happen on the same day, 
only actual rating change is presented.  
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Table 3. Credit rating announcements divided per agency 30.12.1994 to 11.2.2015. 
 
Upgrade Downgrade Positive Negative SUM 
S&P 49 55 4 10 118 
Moody's 43 40 12 17 112 
Fitch 53 46 33 59 191 
Total 145 141 49 86 421 
 
 
Such as in the study by Afonso et al. (2012) the credit ratings are transformed into 
numerical CCR scale. The worst rating gets the value of 0 and the best rating gets the 
value 17. This makes it possible to compare the ratings between the agencies. The CCI 
scales per country can be seen in appendix 1. The linear transformation is presented in 
table 4. All ratings below CCC/Caa2/CCC get the value of zero, because the data is not 
comparable in the state of bankruptcy.  
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Table 4. The credit rating scale and linear transformation. 
Rating agency Linear 
transformation 
Rating quality 
S&P Moody’s Fitch 
AAA Aaa AAA 17 
Investment grade 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 
A- A3 A- 11 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
Speculative Grade 
BB Ba2 BB 6 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 
B- B3 B- 2 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 1 
CCC Caa2 CCC 
 CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
 CC 
Ca 
CC 
 C C   
D C DDD   
Default SD 
 
DD 
 D   D   
 
 
4.2 Bond data 
 
A 10 year government bond data for the 20 European countries is achieved from the 
DataStream. Both yield data and bond index data are used. Daily yield data was not 
available for 5 countries Austria, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Poland. The yield data 
is used for creating the bond spreads and further for constructing the CDS bases. The 
bond index data is more comprehensive when considering the sample size. The daily 
data is available for all 20 countries. 
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The yield spread is calculated as a difference between 10 year governments bonds yield 
over the risk free yield (formula 6). The 10 year bond of Germany is considered as a 
risk free bond in this study. This method is similar than used by Afonso et al. (2012). In 
the alternative analysis, both yield and CDS spread data is also adjusted as a difference 
between country yield spread and country average of yield spreads. This is done to 
prevent the high correlation between the sovereign spreads (Afonso et al. 2012: 611-
612). 
 
 
(6)  Yield spread = bond yield – risk free rate 
 
 
4.3 The CDS data 
 
The 5 year CDS spreads are achieved from the DataStream. The impact of credit rating 
announcements on CDS spreads is measured using the same methodology than for the 
yield spreads. Additionally, the CDS bases are constructed from the yield spreads and 
CDS spreads. The availability of CDS data restricts the sample periods used for CDS 
analysis. Table 5 presents the different starting dates for data samples per country. The 
dates marked with * mean that the data sample ends before 11.2.2015. The CDS spread 
for France is only available between 16.8.2005 – 30.09.2010 and the CDS spread for 
United Kingdom is available between 13.11.2007 – 30.9.2010. It can be seen from the 
table 4 that the data is most limited for the countries from Eastern Europe, while 
western countries have data for the whole sample.  
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Table 5. The data starting dates for yields and CDS spreads per country. 
Country Bond index data  Yield spread data CDS data 
Austria 30.12.1994 - 6.1.2004 
Belgium 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 5.1.2004 
Czech Republic 28.4.2000 1.5.2000 6.1.2004 
Denmark 30.12.1994 22.5.1995 8.9.2003 
Finland 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 18.3.2008 
France 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 *16.8.2005 
Germany 30.12.1994 30.12.1994 8.1.2004 
Greece 31.3.1999 23.3.1998 9.1.2004 
Hungary 19.1.1999 19.1.1999 1.1.2004 
Ireland 30.12.1994 - 23.6.2006 
Italy 30.12.1994 - 20.1.2004 
Latvia 7.10.2004 7.10.2004 13.1.2006 
Lithuania 15.4.2003 15.4.2003 6.6.2005 
Netherlands 30.12.1994 - 23.10.2006 
Poland 29.12.2000 - 1.1.2004 
Portugal 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 26.1.2004 
Romania 22.2.2007 22.2.2007 1.1.2004 
Spain 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 23.10.2006 
Sweden 30.12.1994 2.1.1995 11.8.2003 
United Kingdom 30.12.1994 19.5.1995 *13.11.2007 
 
Note: * the CDS data for France and United Kingdom ends 30.9.2010. 
 
 
4.4 The CDS basis 
 
The CDS basis is calculated using formula 5 in chapter 3.4. It can be seen from the table 
5 that the data for yield spread is missing for Austria, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and 
Poland. It means that the CDS basis cannot be calculated for these 5 countries. The CDS 
basis per country can be seen in figure 1.  It can be seen that the CDS basis is the most 
volatile for Greece.  
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Figure 1. CDS basis per country in alphabetical order from 1.1.2004 to 11.2.2015.  
 
 
 
Note: The data for Austria, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Poland is missing because the yield data is not available for these countries.
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The event study methodology by Afonso et al. (2012) is followed in this thesis. 
Additionally the impact of credit rating announcements on CDS basis is studied. A 
fixed effects panel data regression is used for the analysis.  
 
When using an ordinary event study methodology the regression analysis is first 
performed during the time before the event. Abnormal return is calculated using 
formula 7. The credit rating announcements occur so frequently that it is not possible to 
perform the regression for pre-event window. This is the reason why RMt is replaced by 
the return of German Bund in this study as in the study by Afonso et al. (2012).  
 
 
(7)  ARit = Rit – RMt  
 
 
5.1 The first hypothesis 
 
The first hypothesis investigates if the bond (CDS) market is efficient and not effected 
by credit rating announcements. The impact of a credit rating announcement on yield 
spreads, CDS spreads and CDS basis is studied. Dummy variables are used to indicate 
rating changes. For example the following dummies are used for S&P: S&PUp, 
S&PDown, S&PPositive and S&PNegative, where up and down present actual rating 
changes and Positive and Negative present the outlook of the rating.  
 
A country (and time) fixed effects panel regression is used for the analysis. The panel 
data regression combines the cross-section data together with time series data, and 
allows dynamic hypotheses. The fixed effects model is effective, when analyzing time 
varying changes within the entities. This requires that the variables vary in time. The 
use of panel data increases the sample size, which reduces the collinearity. The problem 
of using panel data is time-varying heterogeneity, which is tested with chi-squared test. 
The panel data that is used is mostly balanced for the bond data, but the availability of 
CDS data has lots of variation. The use of panel data helps to prevent the specification 
problem (Afonso et al. 2012). The country fixed effects panel regression is presented in 
formula 8. The formula 11 takes into account the change on yield in a [1,-1] time 
window and is utilized within the formula 9.  
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(8) Sit = αi + ρSit-1 + βDit + εit  
 
 
Where,  
S states the adjusted measures for yields 
αi refers to country fixed effects 
D is a dummy variable for rating change.  
 
 
All credit rating actions are taken into account by using separate dummies for each 4 
announcements for all 3 agencies, in total 12 different dummies are used. The rating 
actions can be seen separated in formulas 4 and 5. 
 
 
 (9)                   Δ𝑆𝑖  =  α𝑖  + ∑ βU𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
+ ∑ γD𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
+ ∑ δP𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
+ ∑ θN𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
 
 
 
Where, U presents the regression coefficient for upgrades, D for downgrades, P for 
positive revisions and N for negative revisions. The impact of each credit rating agency 
is presented in the summation, which is opened in formula 10 for upgrades. 
 
 
(10)                ∑ βU𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
 =  λU𝑖𝑡 + μU𝑖𝑡 + ρU𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Where, λ presents the regression coefficient for upgrade from S&P, μ for Moody’s and 
ρ for Fitch. 
 
 
(11)                   Δ𝑆𝑖  =  𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 
 
 
Where, S states the adjusted measures for yields (CDS spread), αi refers to country fixed 
effects and D is a dummy variable for rating change. K presents the 3 credit rating 
agencies.  
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In practice, all credit rating actions are taken into account by using separate dummies 
for each 4 announcements for all 3 agencies, in total 12 different dummies are used, 
which is shown in formula 9. The same regression is performed for bond indexes, yield 
spreads, CDS spreads and CDS basis. The regression for bond indexes does not take 
into account the market return. The balanced market return portfolio that is constructed 
for these 20 countries is stationary and thereby impossible to use in a fixed effects 
regression. 
 
The CDS basis is calculated using the formula 5, presented in chapter 3.4, where the 
asset swap spread is the difference between country yield spread and the spread of 
German bund. The CDS basis replaces the adjusted measures for yields in formula 8. 
The formula 9 is used for the regression, where ΔSi is replaced with a change in CDS 
basis in a [1,-1] time window.  
  
  
5.2 The second hypothesis 
 
The second hypothesis analyzes the anticipation of credit rating announcements by 
Bond market, CDS market and CDS basis. When studying the developing markets, 
Ismailescu & Kazemi (2010) find that CDS market anticipates the change at least a 
month prior to the change. Afonso et al. (2012: 617, 619) test the anticipation in two 
time windows [-30,-1] and [-60,-1], but they only analyze the positive and negative 
announcements separately. They find that the CDS market is able to anticipate negative 
events in a 60 day time window. In this thesis the anticipation is studied separately for 
each 12 rating actions. 
 
The second hypothesis investigates if a credit rating change is anticipated by the market 
in a time period of [-30, -1]. The analysis is performed by using formula 9 and changing 
the Δ𝑆𝑖  as seen in formula 12. The regressions are performed for bond indexes, yield 
spreads, CDS spreads and CDS basis. 
 
 
(12)                  Δ𝑆𝑖  =  𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑖𝑡−30 
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5.3 The third hypothesis 
 
The third hypothesis analyzes if the impact of credit rating announcements has changed 
over time. The credit rating agencies were accused of worsening the crisis and having 
too much power during the financial crisis. This hypothesis analyzes the impact of 
credit rating announcements in two different time periods: before and after the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy that occurred in September 15, 2008. Previous studies have shown 
contradictory results about the change in market efficiency.  
 
The formulas 4 to 6 are used for the analysis, but the data sample periods are divided 
into two time periods, before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Afonso et 
al. (2012) point out the problem of having only four positive events after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. In this more recent dataset the number of positive events has 
increased into 42. The same regression is performed for bond indexes, yield spreads, 
CDS spreads and CDS basis. The first period includes the data from December 30, 1994 
to September 14, 2008 and the second period includes the rata from September 15, 2008 
to February 2, 2015. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
The results for the whole sample regressions are much in line with the previous studies 
presented in chapter 2.1. Regardless of a five year longer time period than used by 
Afonso et al. (2012), the results are within a very small marginal from their results for 
bond and CDS markets using the whole sample. 
 
If the new regulation works like the European Commission has planned, the impact of 
credit rating changes on bond market should have weakened. This would mean that the 
market is more efficient. The new regulation should increase the predictability of the 
recently released credit ratings.  
 
 
6.1 The results for the first hypothesis 
 
First the bond indexes are analyzed for impacts from credit rating changes. The data for 
bond indexes is more comprehensive than the data for yield spreads, which makes this 
analysis more extensive. Simultaneously the lack of market impact can bias the results. 
Available data samples can be seen in table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Bond index changes of event countries during rating changes. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
 
 S&P 0.57*** (4.41) -0.87*** (-8.10) 0.40 (0.77) -0.17 (-0.70) 
 Moody'
s 0.10 (0.76) -0.93*** (-7.80) -0.18 (-0.67) -0.98*** (-5.31) 
 Fitch 0.11 (0.97) -0.25** (-2.23) -0.04 (-0.28) -0.00 (-0.02) 
 
      Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. T-statistics is expressed in brackets and equivalent significance at 
level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-
1,1], which indicates a change in bond index from t-1 to t+1. 
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The regression on bond indexes shows that upgrades from S&P are the only positive 
announcements that have an impact on bond indexes. Downgrades from all agencies 
lower the bond indexes and the announcements from Moody’s have the largest impact. 
Negative revisions from Moody’s have roughly equally large impact than actual 
downgrades from Moody’s. 
 
The regression on yield spreads shows also that upgrades from S&P are the only 
positive announcements that have an impact on yield spreads. An upgrade from S&P 
leads on average to -8.03 basis points lower yield spread. Downgrades and negative 
Outlook notations from S&P and Moody’s increase the spread. Downgrades are the 
only announcements from Fitch that have an impact on yield spreads. A downgrade 
from S&P increases the spread for 16.31 basis points, while a downgrade from Fitch 
increases the spread for only 8.51 basis points. This means that the first hypothesis is 
rejected. The credit rating actions have an impact on yield spreads. There are no results 
for positive revisions for Standard & Poor’s, because of small amount of positive 
revisions. Table 7 shows the results for the yield spread analysis. The results are in line 
with the results by Afonso et al. (2012). 
 
 
Table 7. Yield spread changes of event countries during rating changes. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
 Upgrade  Downgrades Positive 
revision 
Negative revision 
 
 S&P 
 
-8.03* (-1.68) 
 
16.31*** (3.99) - 22.48** (2.21) 
 Moody's 
 
-2.55 (-0.50) 
 
15.80*** (3.45) 3.55 (0.35) 14.88** (2.15) 
 Fitch 
 
-2.44 (-0.58) 
 
8.51** (1.99) 1.03 (0.17) 5.12 (1.35) 
 
      Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. Yield spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed 
in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, 
** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the spread change from time 
t-1 to t+1. 
 
 
The regression on CDS spreads shows slightly different results on table 8. Credit 
downgrades from all three agencies have an impact on CDS spreads and negative 
revisions from Moody’s also increase the spread.  The negative revisions from Moody’s 
have a larger impact on CDS spread than downgrades from S&P or Fitch. In general, 
positive announcements decrease the spread and negative announcements increase the 
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spread, but interestingly the negative revisions from Fitch seem to lower the spread 
(significant on 15% level). The results are well in line with the results from different 
markets by Afonso et al. (2012), Hull et al. (2004) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
i.e. mainly negative announcements have an impact on yield spreads. 
 
 
Table 8. CDS spread changes of event countries during rating changes. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
 Upgrade  Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
 
 S&P 
 
-3.63 (-1.07) 
 
8.18*** (3.79) - 5.01 (1.01) 
 Moody's 
 
-1.18 (-0.28) 
 
17.13*** (6.79) 0.00 (0.00) 13.35*** (3.58) 
 Fitch 
 
-0.89 (-0.27) 
 
13.15*** (5.38) -4.28 (-1.11) -3.35 (-1.54) 
 
      Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed 
in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** 
and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the spread change from t-1 to 
t+1. 
 
 
The analysis for the CDS basis accepts the first hypothesis on 10% significance level, 
which can be seen in table 9. None of the announcements have an impact on CDS basis 
in a three day window [1,-1]. Downgrades from S&P are significant on 15% level and 
negative revisions from Fitch ratings are significant on 20% level. CDS basis indicates 
the mispricing between CDS and bond markets. This means that credit rating actions do 
not cause significant mispricing between these two markets and therefore these markets 
work efficiently. The small amount of overlapping data between CDS spreads and yield 
spreads might bias the results. Only 15 countries with 3001 days of data were available 
for this analysis. 5 countries had no overlapping data for CDS spread and yield spread.  
 
 
Table 9. CDS basis changes of event countries during rating changes. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
 Upgrade  Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
 
 S&P 
 
9.65 (1.04) 
 
-9.58 (-1.63) - -13.19 (-0.92) 
 Moody's 
 
-1.71 (-0.14) 
 
-0.18 (-0.03) 0.14 (0.00) 0.21 (0.02) 
 Fitch 
 
4.15 (0.48) 
 
7.36 (1.15) -4.97 (-0.45) -7.52 (-1.29) 
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Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. Both, Yield spreads and CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. 
T-statistics is expressed in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
are expressed with ***, ** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the 
spread change from t-1 to t+1. 
 
 
6.2 The results for the second hypothesis 
 
The second hypothesis investigates if credit rating actions are anticipated by bond and 
CDS markets in a one month window. The first regression on table 10 shows that the 
bond indexes are able to anticipate downgrades from all rating agencies and negative 
revisions from Moody’s in a one month window. Negative revisions from Moody’s 
have the strongest impact on bond indexes. 
  
 
Table 10. Anticipation of rating changes in a one month window by bond indexes. 
 
Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. T-statistics is expressed in brackets and equivalent significance at 
level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-30,-
1], which indicates the spread change from t-30 to t-1. 
 
 
The results for the second hypothesis on yield spreads can be seen in table 11. Both, 
upgrades and downgrades from S&P and Fitch are anticipated by the yield spread in a 
one month window. Also negative revisions from Moody’s are anticipated by the yield 
spread. Downgrades from Moody’s are significant on 25% level. On average a 50 basis 
point move in a yield spread could indicate a future rating change from S&P or Fitch or 
negative revision from Moody’s. The results are against the study by Afonso et al. 
(2012); in their study no anticipation is found in a one month window. 
 
 
  
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades  Positive revision  Negative 
revision 
S&P 0.12 (0.27) -2.43*** (-6.88) 
 
0.76 (0.43  -0.74 (-0.88) 
Moody's 0.07 (0.14) -2.78*** (-6.71) 
 
1.11 (1.24)  -3.13*** (-4.97) 
Fitch 0.14 (0.35) -1.45*** (-3.74) 
 
0.52 (0.96)  -0.17 (-0.51)  
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Table 11. Anticipation of rating changes in a one month window by yield spreads. 
 
Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes. Positive and negative refer to 
the revisions. Yield spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed in brackets 
and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** and *. Time 
period for the analysis is [-30,-1], which indicates the spread change from t-30 to t-1. 
 
 
The anticipation analysis for CDS spreads on table 12 shows that the CDS market is 
more efficient than bond market in anticipating future rating changes. R-squared is 0.34 
for CDS market, while it is 0.13 for bond indexes. Downgrades from all rating agencies 
and negative revisions from Moody’s and Fitch Ratings are anticipated by the CDS 
market. Only positive announcement that is anticipated by the CDS market is the 
upgrade from Fitch ratings.  
 
These results are much in line with the results by Hull et al. (2004) and Ismailescu et al. 
(2010), but against the results by Afonso et al. (2012). Downgrades and negative 
revisions are anticipated one month ahead by the first two studies. Afonso et al. (2012) 
were only able to find anticipation in a two month window before the event. The five 
years longer sample period that includes many crisis years could deviate the results 
from the ones from Afronso et al. who handle all ratings in two groups: positive and 
negative. 
 
 
Table 12. Anticipation of rating changes in a one month window by the CDS market. 
 
Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed in 
brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** 
and *. Time period for the analysis is [-30,-1], which indicates the spread change from t-30 to t-
1. 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades  Positive   Negative  
S&P -44.65*** (-3.13) 55.54*** (4.55) 
 
-  -17.59 (-0.58) 
Moody's 2.21 (0.14) 17.06 (1.24) 
 
-1.05 (-0.09)  51.36** (2.49) 
Fitch -55.47*** (-4.41) 54.31*** (4.25) 
 
-1.54 (-0.86)  15.19 (1.34)  
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades  Positive revision  Negative 
revision 
S&P 5.88 (0.51) 65.71*** (9.02) 
 
-  4.87 (0.29) 
Moody's 4.70 (0.32) 31.95*** (3.75) 
 
1.94 (0.03)  41.43*** (3.29) 
Fitch -27.71** (-2.50) 28.04*** (3.40) 
 
-7.16 (-0.55)  26.41*** (3.56) 
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The CDS basis is able to anticipate downgrades from Standard & Poor’s on 10% 
significance level and downgrades from Fitch Ratings on 15% significance level. 
Upgrades from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are also anticipated by CDS basis. 
Negative revisions from Fitch are anticipated on 10% significance level. It can be seen 
from table 13 that all significant announcements drive the basis to the positive side. 
There seems to be mispricing before the rating changes between the CDS and bond 
markets, but the fact that the mispricing is changing could mean that the market is 
changing towards efficient prices already before the rating change. The first analysis in 
chapter 6.1 is not able to find change in mispricing just before the rating change. 
 
 
Table 13. Anticipation of rating changes in a one month window by CDS-basis. 
 
Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. CDS basis is expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed in 
brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** 
and *. Time period for the analysis is [-30,-1], which indicates the spread change from t-30 to t-
1. 
 
 
6.3 The results for the third hypothesis 
 
The third hypothesis tests, if the impact of credit rating announcements has changed in 
time. The results show that the impact is different for the two periods for all four 
samples, which means that the third hypothesis is rejected.  
 
It can be seen from table 14 that the third hypothesis is rejected for the bond indexes. 
The impact from credit rating announcements on bond indexes has changed in time. 
Before the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy the downgrades from S&P and negative 
revisions from Moody’s were the only negative announcements that had an impact on 
bond indexes. Upgrades from S&P are the only positive announcements that are 
statistically significant. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades  Positive revision  Negative 
revision 
S&P 89.24 (3.60) *** 28.67 (1.84) * 
 
-  37.98 (1.00) 
Moody's 10.50 (0.32) 17.27 (0.97) 
 
-3.65 (-0.04)  -12.60 (-0.49) 
Fitch 78.81 (3.47) *** -24.91 (-1.46) 
 
-7.75 (-0.27)  26.06 (1.66) * 
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After the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy downgrades from S&P and Moody’s and 
negative revisions from Moody’s have an impact on bond indexes. Rating upgrades 
from S&P are the only positive announcements that have an impact. Downgrades from 
Fitch ratings are significant on 15% level. This analysis shows that the market has not 
become more efficient during the recent years. 
 
 
Table 14. Bond index changes of event countries during rating changes before and 
after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
Pre-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P 0.29*** (2.88) -0.59*** (-3.51) -0.09 (-0.20) 0.12 (0.39) 
Moody's 0.09 (0.92) 0.29 (0.93) -0.19 (-1.18) -0.99** (-2.26) 
Fitch -0.02 (-0.21) -0.09 (-0.48) 0.13 (1.09) -0.02 (0.14) 
Post-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P 0.98*** (3.35) -0.88*** (-5.42) - -0.25 (-0.62) 
Moody's 0.12 (0.34) -0.99*** (-5.56) - -0.95*** (-3.44) 
Fitch 0.42 (1.36) -0.27 (-1.55) -0.45 (-1.13) -0.01 (-0.07) 
     Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. T-statistics is expressed in brackets and equivalent significance at 
level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, ** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-
1,1], which indicates the spread change from t-1 to t+1. 
 
The pre-Lehman sample on yield spreads in table 15 shows that negative revisions from 
all agencies and downgrades from S&P have an impact on yield spread. Upgrades from 
Moody’s are the only positive announcements that have an impact on yield spreads. 
Negative revisions had the largest impact.   
 
The analysis after the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy shows that the market efficiency 
has increased. Only downgrades from S&P and Moody’s have an impact on yield 
spreads on a 10% significance level. None of the announcements from Fitch have an 
impact on the yield spreads. The results are against the results by Afonso et al. (2012); 
in their sample only negative announcements in pre-Lehman period were significant. In 
their analysis all announcements were handled in two samples: positive and negative. 
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Table 15. Yield spread changes of event countries during rating changes before and 
after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
Pre-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P -1.64 (-0.83) 9.52***  (2.70) - 19.48*** (3.50) 
Moody's -4.68** (-2.39) -6.70 (-1.05) 3.50 (1.08) 15.66** (1.99) 
Fitch -0.06 (-0.04) 3.55 (0.90) 1.46 (0.61) 4.18** (1.97) 
Post-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P -17.06 (-1.45) 17.28** (2.49) - 23.89 (1.21) 
Moody's 2.39 (0.16) 16.91** (2.28) - 14.31 (1.25) 
Fitch -7.51 (-0.64) 9.01 (1.25) 0.43 (0.03) 5.45 (0.74) 
     Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. Yield spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is 
expressed in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed 
with ***, ** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the spread change 
from t-1 to t+1. 
 
 
When analyzing the pre-Lehman period for CDS spreads, upgrades from S&P and 
positive revisions from Fitch are the only positive announcements that have an impact 
on CDS spread. Downgrades from S&P are the only negative announcements that have 
an impact. It can be seen from table 16 that the positive revisions from Fitch have the 
largest impact, lowering the spread for 7.51 basis points on average. 
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Table 16. CDS spread changes of event countries during rating changes before and 
after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
Pre-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P -6.04** (-2.36) 4.03*  (1.67) - 0.20 (0.05) 
Moody's -1.97 (-0.54) -1.23 (-0.20) -0.16 (-0.03) 0.52 (0.08) 
Fitch -1.89 (-0.88) 0.37 (0.11) -7.51*** (-3.35) -0.56 (-0.35) 
Post-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P -2.50 (-0.49) 9.17*** (3.19) - 6.51 (0.94) 
Moody's -0.98 (-0.16) 17.71*** (5.61) - 13.90*** (2.93) 
Fitch -0.21 (-0.04) 14.74*** (4.63) -0.55 (-0.08) -4.87 (-1.49) 
     Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed 
in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, 
** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the spread change from t-1 to 
t+1. 
 
 
The results for credit rating announcements on CDS spreads in the post-Lehman period 
are substantially different from the results for pre-Lehman period. No positive rating 
actions have an impact on CDS spreads, while rating downgrades from all the agencies 
have an impact on the CDS spreads. Additionally, negative revisions from Moody’s 
increase the spread. This analysis proves that the efficiency of the CDS market has not 
increased during the latest years. 
 
The sample period could bias the results, because the period after the bankruptcy is 
more turbulent. The crisis countries like Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal have 
been rerated several times in the second period. The rating actions can be seen in 
appendix 1. These results are much in line with the results by Afonso et al. (2012); they 
also found out that the CDS market reacts more strongly on negative announcements 
after the Lehman brother’s bankruptcy. 
 
Expectedly from the first analysis the results for the CDS basis offer little information, 
which can be seen in table 17. The CDS basis in pre-Lehman period is only affected by 
positive revisions from Fitch ratings and negative revisions from Standard & Poor’s. 
Both announcements drive the basis towards negative. None of the other 
announcements impact the basis.  
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In the post-Lehman period, none of the announcements have an impact on the basis. 
This means that the pricing between these two markets has become more efficient 
during the recent years in Europe. This analysis still needs some more data to confirm 
the results. The small amount CDS data might bias the results. Also some other time 
periods could be considered in addition to [-1,1]. 
 
 
Table 17. CDS basis changes of event countries during rating changes before and after 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
 
Rating 
Agency 
Upgrade Downgrades Positive revision Negative revision 
Pre-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P -6.00 (-0.96) -4.22  (-0.87) - -19.43** (-2.56) 
Moody's 0.48 (0.04) 7.04 (0.65) 0.26 (0.02) -14.16 (-1.31) 
Fitch -2.12 (-0.46) -2.54 (-0.41) -10.82** (-2.01) -4.03 (-1.33) 
Post-Lehman bankruptcy 
   S&P 13.87 (1.07) -10.50 (-1.34) - -9.80 (-0.45) 
Moody's -2.02 (-0.12) -0.34 (-0.04) - 1.26 (0.10) 
Fitch 7.32 (0.57) 8.51 (1.02) -1.08 (-0.06) -9.59 (-1.06) 
     Note: Upgrades and downgrades refer to actual rating changes and revisions refer to the 
anticipation of the rating. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. T-statistics is expressed 
in brackets and equivalent significance at level of 1%, 5% and 10% are expressed with ***, 
** and *. Time period for the analysis is [-1,1], which indicates the spread change from t-1 to 
t+1. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate if credit rating announcements from the 
three largest credit rating agencies Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and 
Fitch Ratings have an impact on bond and CDS markets in Europe. The credit rating 
agencies were accused of causing the financial crisis and worsening the European 
sovereign debt crisis. This thesis studied the subject from three aspects. Firstly, do the 
credit rating announcements have an impact on bond and CDS markets? Secondly, can 
bond and CDS markets anticipate the future credit rating changes? Thirdly, has the 
impact of credit rating announcements changed before and after the Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy? Additionally the CDS basis is used to study the mispricing between bond 
and CDS markets, which has not been taken into account in earlier studies. 
 
A fixed effects panel regression is used for performing the analysis. The country and 
time variables are fixed. The data consists of bond and CDS data for 20 European 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  The data sample begins 30.12.1994 and 
ends 11.2.2015, which means that the data sample is extended by five years compared 
to the reference study by Afonso et al. (2012). This enables also the studying of the 
impacts of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
The first hypothesis investigated if the bond (CDS) market is efficient and not effected 
by credit rating announcements. The hypothesis was rejected for all other factors than 
CDS basis. The credit rating actions do have an impact on bond and CDS markets. The 
analysis with CDS basis shows that the pricing between these two markets is efficient in 
a two day window, during rating changes in Europe.  
 
Downgrades from all rating agencies have an impact on yield spreads. Negative 
revisions from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s also have an impact on the yield spread. 
Upgrades from Standard & Poor’s are the only positive announcements that have 
impact on yield spreads. The results for the CDS spread are in line with the results for 
yield spread for the first hypothesis. Downgrades from all three rating agencies increase 
the spread. Depart from yield spreads the negative revisions from Moody’s increase the 
CDS spread. These results indicate that the bond and CDS markets are not totally 
efficient. The credit rating announcements are composed from publicly available data 
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that is available for all investors. If the markets were efficient, the credit rating actions 
would not have any impact on these markets.  
 
The second hypothesis analyzed if the credit rating announcements are anticipated by 
bond market, CDS market and CDS basis in a -30 to -1 day window. The hypothesis is 
rejected for all data samples. The yield spread is able to anticipate downgrades from 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch ratings and negative revisions from Moody’s.  Upgrades 
from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are also anticipated. The CDS spread is able 
to anticipate downgrades from all the tree agencies and negative revisions from 
Moody’s and Fitch. Upgrades from Fitch are the only positive announcements that are 
anticipated. 
 
The CDS basis is able to anticipate upgrades from S&P and Fitch and downgrades from 
S&P. Negative revisions from Fitch are the only revisions that are anticipated. This 
analysis proves that there is mispricing between bond and CDS markets in a one month 
window before the rating change and the misprizing is larger before positive 
announcements. All rating actions drive the CDS basis towards positive values, but 
upgrades have the largest impact. Previous studies have shown that the CDS market 
leads the pricing process between these two markets. 
 
The third hypothesis analyzed if the impact of credit rating announcements has changed 
over time. The sample is divided into two groups: before and after the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. The results for the yield spread shows that the impact of credit 
rating announcements has changed in time. Before the bankruptcy all negative revisions 
and downgrades from S&P increased the spread. Upgrades from Moody’s were the only 
positive announcements that have a significant impact on yield spread. After the 
bankruptcy only downgrades from S&P and Moody’s have a significant impact on yield 
spread. 
 
The results for CDS spread before the bankruptcy show that upgrades and downgrades 
from S&P and positive revisions from Fitch have an impact on the CDS spread. After 
the bankruptcy downgrades from all agencies and negative revisions from Moody’s 
have an impact on the CDS spread. Expectedly positive announcements decrease the 
spread and negative announcements increase the spread. 
 
The third hypothesis is rejected, which means that the impact from credit rating 
announcements have changed in time. One would expect that the market efficiency 
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would have increased in time. The yield spread analysis shows that a smaller amount of 
rating actions impact the spread after the bankruptcy, but the magnitude of impact has 
not decreased. The CDS spread analysis shows that the impact from rating changes has 
increased in time. These results are in line with the results from Afonso et al. (2012). 
The CDS basis analysis shows that the pricing between these two markets has improved 
in time. The timing of this analysis could bias the results for the third hypothesis. The 
market is reasonably calm for the first sample and the second sample is dated in crisis 
years. 
 
These results indicate that the rating agencies still have a significant role for investors in 
Europe. The market is able to anticipate the future rating changes, but there is still a 
large correction in prices around the rating announcement. CDS basis analysis shows 
that the pricing between bond and CDS markets is effective around the rating 
announcements. 
 
The contribution of this thesis comes from taking into account the CDS basis and using 
longer sample period than in the previous studies. The CDS basis indicated that the 
pricing between bond and CDS markets is efficient around the rating announcement, but 
some mispricing can be found one month before the rating announcements. In this study 
each rating announcement and all the three rating agencies have been analyzed 
separately. This provides more precise information about the impact of each rating 
announcement for the investors. 
 
It would be interesting to repeat the study after the effects of the European sovereign 
debt crisis have disappeared. Is the inefficiency of the bond and CDS markets found in 
this study entirely caused by the European debt crisis and the structural deficit of 
Greece? What kind of results would be received if the countries were categorized in 
groups based on credit ratings? 
 
Future studies could also extend the research area by including larger geographical 
sample of countries. It might be interesting to compare the efficiency of different bond 
and CDS markets of different continents. Would the CDS basis give more significant 
results for example for emerging markets? 
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Appendix 1. Graphs about the CCI scale per agency per 
country 
 
CCI Per agency for Austria 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Belgium 
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CCI Per agency for Denmark 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Finland 
 
 
CCI Per agency for France 
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CCI Per agency for Germany 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Greece 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Hungary 
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CCI Per agency for Ireland 
 
CCI Per agency for Italy 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Latvia 
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CCI Per agency for Lithuania 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Netherland 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Poland 
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CCI Per agency for Portugal 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Romania 
 
 
CCI Per agency for Spain 
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CCI Per agency for Sweden 
 
 
CCI Per agency for United Kingdom 
 
 
 
13
14
15
16
17
18
2
.1
.1
9
9
5
2
.1
.1
9
9
6
2
.1
.1
9
9
7
2
.1
.1
9
9
8
2
.1
.1
9
9
9
2
.1
.2
0
0
0
2
.1
.2
0
0
1
2
.1
.2
0
0
2
2
.1
.2
0
0
3
2
.1
.2
0
0
4
2
.1
.2
0
0
5
2
.1
.2
0
0
6
2
.1
.2
0
0
7
2
.1
.2
0
0
8
2
.1
.2
0
0
9
2
.1
.2
0
1
0
2
.1
.2
0
1
1
2
.1
.2
0
1
2
2
.1
.2
0
1
3
2
.1
.2
0
1
4
2
.1
.2
0
1
5
S&P CCI
Moody's CCI
Fitch CCI
13
14
15
16
17
18
2
.1
.1
9
9
5
2
.1
.1
9
9
6
2
.1
.1
9
9
7
2
.1
.1
9
9
8
2
.1
.1
9
9
9
2
.1
.2
0
0
0
2
.1
.2
0
0
1
2
.1
.2
0
0
2
2
.1
.2
0
0
3
2
.1
.2
0
0
4
2
.1
.2
0
0
5
2
.1
.2
0
0
6
2
.1
.2
0
0
7
2
.1
.2
0
0
8
2
.1
.2
0
0
9
2
.1
.2
0
1
0
2
.1
.2
0
1
1
2
.1
.2
0
1
2
2
.1
.2
0
1
3
2
.1
.2
0
1
4
2
.1
.2
0
1
5
S&P CCI
Moody's CCI
Fitch CCI
67 
 
Appendix 2. CDS spread per country in alphabetical order 
 
Note: The countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. CDS spread is presented in basis points in y-axis 
and time is presented in x-axis by country. 
